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ENTRAPMENT, TEMPTATION AND VIRTUE TESTING 
 
We address the ethics of scenarios in which one party (the ‘agent’) entraps, intentionally 
tempts, or intentionally tests the virtue of another (the ‘target’). We classify, in a new manner, 
three distinct types of acts that are of concern, namely acts of entrapment, of (mere) intentional 
temptation and of (mere) virtue testing. Our classification is, for each kind of scenario, of itself 
neutral concerning the question whether the agent acts permissibly (and concerning the extent 
to which the target is culpable). We explain why acts of entrapment are more ethically 
objectionable than like acts of (mere) intentional temptation and why these, in turn, are more 
ethically objectionable than like acts of (mere) virtue testing. Along the way, we scrutinize, 
and eventually reject, the view that acts of entrapment are ethically unacceptable because 
intentional temptation is involved in entrapment. (The article touches upon, but is not about, 
the question of culpability.)  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cases of entrapment involve a party that intends to entrap, whom we call the ‘agent’, and a 
party that is entrapped, whom we call the ‘target’. Let the terms ‘party’, ‘agent’, and ‘target’ 
encompass both individuals and groups. 
Whereas our previous work was neutral about the ethics of entrapment, in this article 
we focus on the ethics of entrapment, temptation and virtue testing. In particular, we look at 
the question of the moral permissibility or impermissibility of these three actions.1 In Section 
II, we summarize our account (from REDACTED), of the concept of entrapment. We then 
contrast entrapment with intentional temptation and with virtue testing. We explain how an 
agent can intentionally present a person with an opportunity to act in a way believed to be 
impermissible, but without intending that the person take up the opportunity to act in this way. 
Procurement involves both intentions. While entrapment, temptation, and virtue testing all 
involve the former intention, only entrapment necessarily involves procurement. 
In Section III, we discuss a moral objection to entrapment that we call ‘the objection 
from temptation’. We focus on a version of this objection proposed by Hughes (2004). On his 
account, the wrong of entrapment resides mainly in the fact that in tempting the target, the 
agent compromises or undermines the autonomy that is necessary for the target properly to be 
held culpable for the entrapped act. After explaining why we regard Hughes’s version of the 
objection as unsound, we strip his version of the objection down into a simpler, more plausible, 
argument from temptation. According to it, the agent intends that the target should fall to the 
temptation to perform an act considered to be impermissible by the agent; it is impermissible 
to intend that an act that one considers impermissible be performed (whether by oneself or 
another); thus, entrapment is impermissible. 
 
1 By ‘impermissibility’ we have in mind just wrongness; i.e. the property underlying the fact that one should not 
perform a morally impermissible action. By ‘permissibility’ we have in mind that the action is not impermissible; 
i.e. that in some circumstances it is not wrong, and may be performed.   





We respond first of all that not every case of entrapment is a case of temptation. While 
there are cases of entrapment in which the agent succeeds in tempting the target, there are also 
cases in which the agent does not intend to tempt, and cases in which, while the target performs 
the impermissible act, it would be incorrect to describe the target as having been tempted (as 
against merely motivated) to perform it. This significantly limits the scope of the objection 
from temptation, both in the form given by Hughes (2004) and in the simpler form arrived at 
in the course of our critique of his position. 
Removal of the appeal to temptation leaves us with an even sparser argument against 
entrapment, which we call ‘the objection from intention’. For those acts of entrapment that are 
of present interest (see Section II) it locates wrong-doing simply in the agent’s intention that 
the target act in a manner considered impermissible by the agent (regardless of whether the 
target is, along the way, tempted): the impermissibility of the target’s entrapped act spreads to 
the agent’s act of entrapment. We dub this ethical principle—the principle that if one considers 
that an act is impermissible then it is impermissible for one to intend its performance (whether 
by oneself or another)—‘the Purist Principle’. In Section IV we discuss and reject this 
principle.   
In Section V, we present a new moral objection to entrapment that we call ‘the objection 
from moral alliance’. According to it, acts of entrapment are typically morally faulty at least 
partly because an agent that entraps someone thereby becomes morally allied (in a manner that 
we explain) with the target’s impermissible act in procuring it. 
In Section VI, we address the morality of virtue testing and intentional temptation: since 
these are exempt from the objection from moral alliance, they are easier for an agent to justify. 
Virtue testing with the intention that the target pass the test is generally permissible, although 
the risks and benefits involved can change the picture. The permissibility of virtue testing with 
the opposite intention, and that of intentional temptation, are generally subject to two 
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conditions drawn from our discussion of the Purist Principle: first, that the target was likely to 
have performed the entrapped act (or something else as bad or worse) later anyway, and, 
secondly, that the entrapped act (or the equally bad or worse act) will not now be performed. 
Nevertheless, we argue that further considerations, concerning risks, harms, benefits, and 
motives, can justify exceptions to these conditions in extreme cases. Section VII is a concluding 
summary.  
 
II. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
This section develops material in REDACTED. It then contrasts entrapment with intentional 
temptation and with virtue testing. Initially, we draw two distinctions, which cut across each 
other, concerning acts of entrapment. The first concerns the status of the agent and the second 
concerns the act that the target performs and that the agent has procured.  
Our first distinction concerns the agent’s status. Legal entrapment occurs when the 
agent is a law-enforcement officer, acting (in accordance with the law or otherwise) in an 
official capacity as a law-enforcement officer, or when the agent is acting on behalf of a law-
enforcement officer, as the officer’s deputy. An example of this would be an undercover police 
officer’s asking a suspected drug pusher to sell drugs in order to arrest the suspect in flagrante. 
When, on the other hand, the agent is neither a law-enforcement officer acting in that capacity 
nor the deputy of such an officer, acting as a deputy of the officer, we have civil entrapment. 
An example of this would be a vigilante’s posing as a child and suggesting, in order to be able 
to perform a citizen’s arrest, to a suspected child molester that he come and molest her. 
Our second distinction concerns the procured act: we distinguish between acts that are 
of a criminal type, as in the above examples, and those that are not. For an example of the latter 
case, an investigative journalist might entrap a politician into performing a morally 
compromising act that is not a crime, in order that the journalist might expose the politician for 





having performed the act. Or, to take an example involving law-enforcement agents: suppose 
that the security service, in their capacity as law-enforcement agents, entrap an enemy spy 
using diplomatic cover into making an embarrassing boast that will lead his superiors to recall 
him thus preventing him from performing the illegal act of espionage. When the act is not 
criminal but is morally compromising in some way (whether by being immoral, embarrassing, 
or socially frowned upon in some way), we are dealing with moral entrapment (using the word 
‘moral’ in a wide sense). When the act is of a criminal type, we have criminal entrapment.  
Thus, four types of entrapment can be distinguished: legal criminal entrapment, civil 
criminal entrapment, civil moral entrapment, and legal moral entrapment. In what follows, we 
restrict our concern to cases of entrapment in which the agent intends to entrap the target into 
performing an action that the agent considers to be morally impermissible. Such cases, we take 
it, may be drawn from all four of these types of entrapment. Entrapment occurs whenever:  
 
(i) an agent plans that a particular act be committed; 
(ii) the planned act is of a type that is criminal, immoral, embarrassing, or socially 
frowned upon (measurable in part by the extent to which the target would 
probably not like the act to be exposed to colleagues, an employer, friends, 
family, or the public); 
(iii) the agent procures the act (by solicitation, persuasion, or incitement); 
(iv) the agent intends that the act should, in principle, be traceable to the person 
performing it (the target) either by being detectable (by a party other than the 
target) or via testimony (including the target’s confession), that is, by evidence 
that would link the target to the act; 
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(v) in procuring the act, the agent intends to be enabled, or intends that a third party 
should be enabled, to prosecute or to expose the target for having performed the 
act. 
 
While it is not a consequence of these conditions, and we do not hold, that whenever entrapment 
happens the target performs an act that the agent considers impermissible, we restrict our 
discussion of the morality of entrapment (and of intentional temptation and virtue testing), in 
subsequent sections, to such cases.2  
We provide an extended discussion and defence of these conditions, building on the 
work of Stitt & James (1984), Gerald Dworkin (1985) and Ho (2011), in REDACTED.3 The 
wording of (i) here differs a little from how we phrased it there. This is to make it clear that it 
is not necessary (as REDACTED has helped us to appreciate) for the agent to intend, de re, of 
a particular target that the target perform the act. Miller and Blacker (2005: 102–109) 
distinguish between targeted action by an agent, aimed at some target in particular, and random 
action, aimed at no-one in particular. For example, if an agent attempts to procure an 
impermissible act from a person that the agent already intends should perform it, then the 
agent’s act of attempted procurement is a targeted one. If, on the other hand, the agent arranges 
a posting to a billboard encouraging those that happen to pass by to perform an impermissible 
act, then the agent’s act of attempted procurement is random. We intend the terms ‘entrapment’, 
‘intentional temptation’, and ‘virtue testing’ to encompass both targeted and random acts. 
We intend condition (v) to include blackmail cases in which the agent intends not that 
the target will be prosecuted or exposed, but that the target will be placed under threat of 
prosecution or exposure.  
 
2 This is because the particular moral problems on which we wish to focus are raised by these cases, but not by 
cases such as when a journalist entraps a celebrity into doing something immoral that the journalist himself or 
herself does not consider immoral. This is not to deny that these other cases themselves raise moral problems. 
3 On condition (i), cf. Feinberg (2003: 73–4). 





Condition (iii), our procurement condition, amends that of Dworkin (1985: 21), 
replacing his ‘enticement’, which includes non-communicative acts, with ‘incitement’, which 
does not.4 Given that our account of procurement is a communicative one, it encompasses what 
Feinberg (2003: 58) calls ‘goading’. In order to understand our position, it is important to note 
that (iii) implies that the target actually does perform, rather than merely attempt, the act 
planned under condition (i).5 
Our definition of entrapment employs a very specific understanding of procurement. 
We understand procurement to involve the agent in having an intentional influence, via directly 
related communicative acts, on the target’s will. If all that the agent does is intentionally present 
the target with the opportunity to perform the act, then this does not amount, on our account, 
to entrapment. Also, what Feinberg (2003: 74) describes as persuasion ‘by noncoercive 
manipulation’ counts, on our account, as procurement, and the fact that the agent’s influence 
upon the target’s will is of a non-coercive nature is, on our account, a distinguishing mark of 
procurement. 
If one procures an offence one causes it, albeit indirectly, to occur. Not all cases of 
causation are cases of procurement: given our account’s appeal to communicative acts, if A 
causes B to perform an action by administering a drug, then A has not procured that action from 
B. By contrast, if A threatens B by saying that A will shoot B, or expose B’s darkest secrets, 
unless B performs a certain action, then A has procured that action, provided that B does it 
under the influence of A’s threat. Likewise, if A influences B’s will in a similar fashion, but 
through a bribe, then this counts as procurement. Procurement always goes by appeal to the 
will, even if the target acts irrationally in performing the procured action. Procurement need 
 
4 We understand that different legal jurisdictions attach different levels of significance to the notion of 
procurement and that the ensuing, purely philosophical account, of procurement that we provide differs from those 
in common legal currency. We believe, nevertheless, that its doing so is subsequently useful when discussing 
types of act that are, no matter what we might call them, importantly ethically different 
5 We return to this distinction towards the end of the article. 
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not involve an inducement of pleasure to be had or pain to be avoided. One can procure an 
action merely by recommending it or requesting it. The phrase ‘recommending it or requesting 
it’ must be construed so as to include heavy hints and the use of implicature to recommend (as 
in ‘It would be good if our competitor could be made to disappear’). Recommendations and 
requests can also be communicated via such methods as gestures, drawings, mime, and sign-
language. 
 We take it that any act of procurement involves intentional causation (but not vice 
versa). If one unintentionally causes someone to perform a wrongful act, then that is not a case 
of procurement. (It does not follow that in procuring one always intends that one procure: many 
people engaged in procurement are perhaps quite unaware that there is such a thing as 
procurement, and are fully concentrated on the causation.) 
 Let us apply this account of procurement, which appeals to the influence upon the 
target’s will of an act, or series of acts, of communication by the agent, to a couple of examples. 
If the agent leaves a wallet lying in the street in order to trap the target, then the agent has not 
procured the act of taking the wallet unless the agent in some way recommends the action to, 
or requests the action of, the target. It is clear that if an agent actually asks a suspected drug 
dealer to sell drugs then that is a case of procurement. By contrast, if the agent just hangs around 
hoping that the drug dealer will approach and offer the drugs for sale, then that is not 
procurement, even if the agent uses a disguise to resemble a potential client. 
 This account of procurement is somewhat narrower than the standard one used by the 
courts of England and Wales. In a 1975 case (Attorney General’s Reference (No. 1 of 1975), 
[1975] E.W.C.A. Crim 1, [1975] Q.B. 773), the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery, defined 
procurement as follows: ‘To procure means to produce by endeavour. You procure a thing by 
setting out to see that it happens and taking the appropriate steps to produce that happening’ 
(Attorney General’s Ref. [1975] 779F). He allows to qualify as procurement of drink driving 





the surreptitious lacing of a drink without the driver’s knowledge. On our account this would 
not qualify as an example of procurement. 
Let us now turn to the notion of temptation. Whether a person is tempted primarily 
concerns their emotions, rather than their actions. In our view, when a target is tempted, the 
target experiences an urge to perform an act, while also being to some degree internally 
conflicted about that urge (cf. Hughes 2004; 2006a; 2006b). If a person feels tempted to 
perform an act and, as a direct result, attempts to perform it, then that person has succumbed 
to temptation (even if the attempt to perform the act is unsuccessful). 
We distinguish between intentional temptation, in which the target is tempted (even if 
they do not succumb) by an agent intending to tempt them, and merely situational temptation, 
in which someone is in circumstances that they interpret as providing an alluring opportunity. 
A situation may also be said to be tempting when it would tend towards the situational tempting 
of persons put into it. Whereas the situational temptation of an agent is an occurrent matter, 
that a situation is tempting in the sense just mentioned is a dispositional fact about it. Except 
in passing, we are concerned only with intentional temptation. 
Even if it is supposed, against our own account in Section III, that entrapment always 
involves temptation, there is a difference between being entrapped into the performance of an 
act and performing it as a direct result of mere temptation. In entrapment the agent seeks to 
bring about the performance of the act by procurement, that is, by means of certain directly 
related communicative acts. For example, the agent might ask the target ‘Do you have any 
drugs for sale?’. Or the agent might use the imperative form ‘Please sell me some drugs!’ or 
might make a statement with an obvious implication such as ‘I’d like to buy some drugs’. The 
meaning of ‘directly related’ should be clear in view of the contrast that we now draw. 
 For there to be temptation, however, there need not be any procurement, or attempted 
procurement, of the impermissible action. If the agent seeks to bring about the performance of 
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the act by means of non-communicative wiles, or by indirectly related communicative acts, 
then we do not have a case of procurement, and therefore we do not have a case of entrapment, 
even if the agent succeeds in tempting the target into the performance of the act. For example, 
suppose that the agent is posing as a senior citizen with the intention of luring out a mugger. 
The agent might spy a target, and then try to tempt the target to mug by non-communicative 
schemes, such as adopting a doddery walk, ‘accidentally’ dropping some cash, adopting the air 
of one lost etc. Or the agent might even engage in various (indirect) communicative acts, such 
as saying to the target ‘I’m lost and am looking for the bank; can you help?’. Here the agent 
neither requests nor orders the target to mug; rather, the agent’s communicative acts are 
intended to create in the target’s mind certain beliefs that are meant to elicit an intention, on 
the target’s part, to mug the agent (such as the belief that the agent is vulnerable and has money 
on their person). Although temptation need not feature procurement, and what we call ‘mere 
temptation’ does not feature procurement, nevertheless, it may do so.  
Virtue testing is, on our account, distinct from intentional temptation. In a case of virtue 
testing, the agent presents the target with the opportunity for wrong-doing, but without 
necessarily having the intention of bringing it about that the target perform, or be tempted to 
perform, the wrongful act, and without necessarily procuring the wrong action. For example, 
suppose that an agent disagrees with a colleague over whether another colleague, Kim, is a 
thief. Suppose further that the agent is confident not only that Kim is not a thief, but also that 
Kim will not readily experience any urges to steal when presented with the opportunity for 
theft. The agent might say to the colleague ‘I can prove to you that Kim is not a thief; let’s 
leave some money lying out as a test, and you’ll see that Kim won’t take it; in fact, I’m certain 
that Kim won’t even be tempted’. In this scenario, the agent does not intend that Kim take the 
money or feel the urge to take the money; in fact, the agent has the opposite intentions. 
Nevertheless, the agent does intend to provide Kim with the opportunity for wrong-doing.  





Moreover, whenever we trust someone to do something, knowing that they might 
breach our trust, we intentionally present them with an opportunity to do wrong. Doing so is, 
in itself, innocuous. To trust a trustworthy person is not to tempt them (and is certainly not to 
entrap them), even though it may be a test for them.  
Virtue testing, as we define it, occurs when an agent intentionally presents a target with 
an opportunity to perform an act that the agent considers impermissible, in order to discover 
(or demonstrate) whether the target is disposed to perform it. When an agent intentionally 
tempts a target, the agent presents the target with this opportunity having, furthermore, and 
among other things, the intention that the target will experience an urge to perform the 
impermissible act. Virtue testing is consistent with, but does not entail, intentional temptation. 
For two parties, A and B, if A tests B’s virtue then it does not follow that A tempts B, or even 
that A intends to tempt B, though it is possible for a case of virtue testing to be also a case of 
temptation, and, indeed, a case of entrapment too.  
 To sum up, in scenarios of virtue testing, of intentional temptation and of entrapment, 
a common element is the intentional presentation to the target, by the agent, of the opportunity 
to perform an act that the agent considers impermissible. That is, the agent intentionally puts 
the target into a situation that the target might interpret as providing an opportunity for 
wrongdoing. While in cases of entrapment we have procurement (with or without intentional 
temptation), in cases of intentional temptation, although we have temptation, we need not have 
procurement, and in cases of virtue testing we need have neither procurement nor intentional 
temptation.6 For the time being, we focus on entrapment. We return to virtue testing and 
intentional temptation near the end of the paper.  
 
 
6 Contrast the taxonomies of, for example, Dworkin (1985) and Miller and Blackler (2005: 102–109). On the 
distinction between virtue testing and tempting, compare Hughes (2004: 56). 
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III. THE OBJECTION FROM TEMPTATION 
For reasons explained in REDACTED, our definition of entrapment is neutral about whether 
the agent, in entrapping, acts permissibly. Over the next three sections, we are primarily 
concerned with the question of permissibility. 
The basis of the objection from temptation is that there is, in relevant circumstances at 
least, something wrong with intentional temptation. According to the objection, entrapment, at 
least of a given sort, involves intentional temptation, and is wrong for that reason, or else, if it 
does not involve intentional temptation itself, it is wrong because it shares the feature that 
makes intentional temptation wrong.  
A target-centred version of the objection from temptation says that entrapment is wrong 
because of the effects that the agent’s act of entrapment has on the target’s mental states or 
agential capacities. An agent-centred version, which we discuss in more detail in Section IV, 
says that entrapment is wrong because the entrapping agent has the impermissible intention 
that the target will succumb to the temptation to perform an impermissible act. It is the focus 
on the acts or intentions of the agent that makes a version of the objection from temptation 
agent-centred. The specific agent-centred version of the objection that interests us works with 
the general principle that if an act is impermissible then it is thereby impermissible that one 
should intend that it be performed. We dub this principle ‘the Purist Principle’.7 
The first version of the objection from temptation that we wish to consider is from 
Hughes (2004). He argues that legal criminal entrapment, when it is without ‘probable cause’, 
is wrong for the first of the reasons just mentioned: that is, because it involves intentional 
temptation.8 According to Hughes (2004: 45, cf. 55), this sort of ‘entrapment […] illegitimately 
 
7 The Purist Principle is closely related to, but broader than, the principle that ‘formal co-operation’ with 
something impermissible is impermissible. On the notion of formal co-operation see Smith (1995). 
8 Park (1976: 270–73) and Ho (2011: 72–73), among many authors, take it that any act of entrapment involves 
intentional temptation, though they do not explicitly offer this as a moral objection to entrapment. 





violates’ the target’s moral autonomy. For Hughes (2004: 54–55), an agent who entraps in this 
way acts wrongly because that agent deliberately subjects the target to temptation. Whenever 
an agent tempts a target, then, in turn, the target’s ‘will is locked in an internal conflict, and 
this compromises or sometimes even undermines [the target’s] autonomy’ (Hughes 2004: 53). 
In cases of legal criminal entrapment without probable cause, it is this sort of manipulation of 
the target’s will that makes the entrapping agent’s act wrong (Hughes 2004: 56). As Hughes 
(2006a: 224, his italics, cf. 2006b: 355) summarizes his position:  
 
entrapment, like temptation in general, compromises or even undermines the autonomy 
of those entrapped. Since autonomy is required for reasonable ascriptions of moral and 
legal responsibility, the moral problem with entrapment is that it defeats an essential 
condition of criminal liability in the process of detecting and preventing crime. 
 
The position that Hughes endorses is as follows. Entrapment must involve the 
intentional temptation of the target by the agent. This temptation compromises or undermines 
the target’s autonomy, in a manner that is incompatible with the target’s culpability for the 
entrapped act. The view would be that these prerequisites hold for every entrapment scenario, 
from any of the four types discussed in Section II. Thus, given the absence of culpability, no 
punishment, opprobrium, or ostracism of the target would be justifiable. Importantly, the notion 
of culpability in play here is a broadly moral notion distinct from, albeit closely related to, that 
of criminal responsibility.9 Accordingly, a generalized argument from temptation that is 
recoverable from Hughes’s work goes as follows: 
 
 
9 Cf., on the distinction, Feinberg (2003: 67–8, 75): it includes blameworthiness for non-criminal acts, for non-
harmful acts (e.g., offensive or rude acts), and for acts for which, while either harmful or of a criminal type, the 
target is not ultimately held criminally or civilly liable by a court (e.g., because the target is deemed by the court 
to have been entrapped). 
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1. Whenever an agent, A, entraps a target, B, A intentionally tempts B to 
perform the entrapped act, for which A intends that B will be held 
culpable.  
Premise 
2. When B is so tempted, B’s autonomy is either compromised or 
undermined.  
Premise 
3. One is culpable for an act that one has performed only if, in performing 
the act, one’s autonomy is not compromised or undermined.  
Premise 
4. If a person is not culpable for an act, then it is wrong for that person to 
be held culpable for it.  
Premise 
5. If an act is wrong, then it is wrong to act with the intention that it be 
performed (whether by oneself or by another).  
Premise 
6. Whenever an agent, A, entraps a target, B, then B is not culpable for 
the entrapped act.  
From 1, 2, 
3 
7. Whenever an agent, A, entraps a target, B, then it is wrong for B to be 
held culpable for the entrapped act.  
From 4, 6 
8. Whenever an agent, A, entraps a target, B, then A acts wrongly.  From 1, 5, 
7 
 
Before we return to the specifics of Hughes’s own position, let us evaluate some aspects of this 
more general argument. Performing this task serves two roles: it figures, via evaluation of 
material common to both, in our evaluation of Hughes’s own, more restricted, version of the 
objection from temptation and it facilitates the transition into the next phase of our own 
argument. 
 The argument is valid. Its conclusion follows because, according to 1, an entrapping 
agent intends that the target be held culpable for the entrapped act; this is, according to 7, the 





intention, in respect of a wrongful act (i.e., the holding culpable), that it be performed and, 
according to 5, intending, in respect of a wrongful act, that it be performed is itself wrongful. 
(We have been careful to word this so that opacity is not introduced where we do not intend 
it.) Setting aside Premise 1, for now, we note that Premises 2 and 3 are controversial. With 
respect to Premise 2: even if there are temptations that are irresistible, and thus that compel, to 
tempt is not, per se, to compel, and it might be plausibly maintained that resistible temptations 
do not necessarily compromise or undermine the target’s autonomy. With respect to Premise 
3, since compromise to autonomy is, like culpability, a matter of degree, Premise 3 is too 
broadly worded. Even if, contrary to our view, entrapment always involves temptation, and if 
it thereby involves compromise to B’s autonomy, compromise is not all or nothing. To the 
extent that B’s autonomy was not compromised, and in the absence of any other factor that 
exonerates B, B remains to that extent culpable (cf. Fletcher 1978: 542; Altman and Lee 1983: 
59; Feinberg 2003: 58; Dillof 2004: 895). Given the problematic nature of Premises 2 and 3 of 
the above argument, we now shift our focus to an agent-centred version of the objection from 
temptation that dispenses with these premises. The principle put forward in Premise 5, which 
we called earlier ‘the Purist Principle’, features in this argument, and occupies an important 
role in the section after that. 
The new, agent-centred, argument that we wish to consider may be summarized as 
follows:  
 
1. If an act is impermissible, then it is impermissible to act with the 
intention that it be performed (whether by oneself or by another). 
Premise 
2. In entrapment, the agent intends, in respect of an impermissible act 
and a target, that the target should fall to the temptation to perform 
that impermissible act. 
Premise 
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3. Entrapment is impermissible. From 1, 2 
 
Premise 1 of the argument in the previous section overlooked the possibility of a case 
of entrapment for purposes of blackmail, in which the agent did not intend that the target be 
held culpable; Premise 2 here does not have that flaw. A more serious problem remains, 
however, namely that not all cases of entrapment actually involve intentional temptation. In 
the definition of entrapment that we set out in Section II, the notion of temptation played no 
role. On our account, in entrapment scenarios the agent’s crucial intention is that the target 
perform the act that the agent is trying to procure. What goes on in the target’s mind, other than 
inclination of the target’s will towards performance of that act, formation of the intention to 
perform it, and execution of that intention, need not be of concern to the agent.10 Indeed, an 
agent that agreed with Hughes’s views on the relationship between temptation and culpability 
might intend to procure the act just so that the target could properly be held culpable for it, and 
might intend that the target merely perform it, i.e. perform it with no ambivalence or mental 
anguish along the way, rather than perform it as a direct result of having been tempted and 
succumbed. Such an agent wishes the target to be motivated to perform the act, but is at best 
indifferent about whether the target is tempted to perform it.11 Even if entrapment commonly 
involves temptation, it does not, or at least need not, always do so. If acts of entrapment are 
wrong, and are so for a reason related to temptation, then at best this can be because they are 
importantly morally analogous to acts of intentional temptation; it cannot be because any act 
of entrapment essentially involves an act of intentional temptation.  
 
10 While, as stated, we take procurement to be a specific form of intentional inducement, Miller and Blackler 
(2005: 102–105), are right, we think, to talk about inducement into the entrapped act, rather than the temptation 
to perform it, which they do not even mention. Miller, Blackler, and Alexandra (2006: 264) depict inducement as 
something that a target may ‘resist’, but they do not explicitly link it to temptation. 
11 We are motivated to floss our teeth, but we are not ordinarily tempted to do it. To be tempted is to have a kind 
of motivation, with a specific phenomenology: motivation is a broader category. 





IV. THE PURIST PRINCIPLE AND THE OBJECTION FROM 
INTENTION 
 
If we strip away from the agent-centred version of the objection from temptation the appeal to 
temptation, we are left with the following valid argument, which we call ‘the objection from 
intention’. Its first premise is the Purist Principle that we saw at work in each of the two 
preceding arguments. 
 
1. If an act is impermissible, then it is impermissible to act with the 
intention that it be performed (whether by oneself or by another).12 
Premise 
2. In the cases of entrapment that are of interest to us (see Section II), 
the agent has such an intention. 
Premise 
3. Entrapment is, in such cases, impermissible. From 1, 2 
 
Premise 2 of this argument is true as a matter of stipulation. It is Premise 1, the Purist Principle, 
that is of philosophical interest.  
Like intentional temptation towards wrongdoing, entrapment breaches the Purist 
Principle, expressed in Premise 1, that if a certain action is impermissible then it is also 
impermissible to intend that it be performed. To be clear, this principle does not require that 
the agent’s motivating thought be that the target should perform an impermissible action. 
Rather, it suffices that the agent intends, with respect to an impermissible action, that the target 
perform it. 
 
12 This premise could be restricted by adding that the agent must believe, or know, that the act is impermissible. 
This will not matter for what follows. 
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To see the initial appeal of the Purist Principle, take the following example. The Mafia 
boss wants to keep his own hands ‘clean’, and so manipulates the easily led tyro into killing a 
rival that is threatening the boss’s interests. This manipulation need not take the form of full-
blown determinism; it could be that the boss is a shrewd judge of character and can predict 
how the tyro is likely to react in different situations. The boss’s predictions need not even be 
more than guesses; if the mafia boss intends, while recognizing that this intention may not be 
fulfilled, that the tyro kill the rival this seems enough to establish that the Mafia boss is morally 
at fault for having such intentions.  
Although the Purist Principle might sound plausible at first, we hold that it is mistaken. 
We will now refute it by a counter-example based on a real-life case. We quote from an Internet 
blog: 
 
on May 30 1842, John Francis shot at Queen Victoria, riding in her carriage outside 
Buckingham Palace on Constitution Hill. This was actually Francis’s second attempt; the 
day before, he had pulled out his pistol but had either lost courage or his gun had misfired; 
he slipped away. But three people had witnessed him, and one of these was Prince Albert. 
The royal couple, then, was aware that an assailant was on the loose, and they thought it 
more than likely he would strike again.13 
 
Now imagine that on May 30th Prince Albert sees Francis, unaware that he has been spotted, 
loading his pistol, getting ready to make his attempt. Albert deliberately refrains from raising 
the alarm until Francis lifts his arm and points, whereupon Albert sounds the alarm, and Francis 
is caught, as intended, red-handed. In this case, Albert deliberately refrains from sounding the 
alarm, and does so with the intention that Francis perform an action, pointing a gun at the 
 
13 https://shootingvictoria.com/, accessed 24 December 2020. 





Queen, that we may take to be (and was taken by Albert to be) impermissible. It seems to us 
that Albert’s act of refraining here, taken with his intention that Francis point the pistol at the 
Queen, is, contrary to the Purist Principle, permissible. 
 Our example is couched in terms of an omission, but it seems to us that the example 
could easily be changed to feature a positive action. Suppose, for example, that Francis starts 
to abort the assassination attempt as Prince Albert on his horse is blocking his light. Albert 
wishes that Francis be caught red-handed, and moves out of the light, intending that Francis 
load his pistol and point it at Victoria. Here Albert performs an action, moving out of the light, 
with the intention that Francis perform an impermissible action, pointing the pistol. Yet it 
seems to us that Albert’s action, taken together with his intention that Francis perform the 
impermissible act, is permissible, contrary to the Purist Principle. 
Our examples show, we take it, that the Purist Principle is untenable, and that, 
accordingly, the objection from intention is unsound. We started out from a target-centred 
version of the objection from temptation, and we moved from it to increasingly more plausible, 
but, we have argued, ultimately unsound, agent-centred objections that were recoverable from 
it. The most plausible of these, namely the objection from intention, was based on the Purist 
Principle. Given that, we argued, even this objection was unsuccessful, is there any decent 
agent-centred objection in the vicinity? We believe that there is, although the one we are about 
to describe has a more modest goal, in that it is not designed to show that entrapment is 
impermissible. We call this new objection ‘the objection from moral alliance’. We do not 
suggest that this objection is the only viable moral objection to entrapment. Neither do we 
suggest that targeted-centred considerations, such as the appeal to rights of the target that an 
act of entrapment may be held to breach, have no important role to play. Rather, our aim, in 
introducing the objection from moral alliance, is to draw attention to the interesting nature of 
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this new objection and, especially, to its value in explaining why entrapment is harder morally 
to justify than intentional temptation and virtue testing. 
 
V. THE OBJECTION FROM MORAL ALLIANCE 
For parity with the arguments that we have criticized, let us set out the objection from moral 
alliance in standard form, before we proceed to explain it in more detail. 
 
1. In the cases of entrapment that are of interest to us (see Section II), 
the agent procures the target’s performance of an impermissible act.   
Premise 
2. An agent that procures (or attempts to procure) the performance of an 
act thereby becomes more closely morally allied with that act than 
would have been the case if the agent had, other things being equal, 
merely intentionally tempted the target into the act’s performance 
(that is, without attempting to procure it).   
Premise 
3. The more closely morally allied an agent’s action is with a target’s 
impermissible act then, other things being equal, the worse that 
agent’s action is, morally speaking.  
Premise 
4. An agent that procures (or attempts to procure) a target’s performance 
of an impermissible act thereby does something morally worse than 
would have been the case if the agent had, other things being equal, 
merely intentionally tempted the target into the act’s performance 
(that is, without attempting to procure it).  
From 1, 2, 
3 
 
Entrapment to perform an impermissible action is morally objectionable, from an agent-centred 
point of view, because it allies the agent, via the agent’s procurement (or attempted 





procurement) of it, with the impermissible act. The attempted procurement of the act involves 
the agent, on our account, and at least if it is a good attempt, in commending, requesting, or 
enjoining the performance of the target’s impermissible act. 
Suppose that each of two agents, A and B, intends that a target, C in the case of A, and 
D in the case of B, perform an impermissible act. A decides to entrap C by enjoining C to 
perform this act. B decides merely to present to D the opportunity to perform the same act, with 
the hope that D will perceive this opportunity as alluring, but without enjoining it or 
recommending it to D in any way. In short, A decides to entrap C, and B decides intentionally 
to tempt, but not to entrap, D. Other things being equal, A’s act is the more objectionable. This 
is because in performing the communicative acts that are intended to procure C’s act, A 
becomes strongly allied with that act. This is similar to the common suggestion that lying is 
worse, ceteris paribus, than mere deception, even if both involve the intention to produce in 
the other party a false belief: in lying, one allies oneself, by means of one’s verbal act, more 
thoroughly with the false content than one does in mere deception.14 Indeed, in lying one not 
only commits oneself to the false content, but usually intends that the target believe the false 
content precisely on the basis of one’s committing of oneself to it.15 Of course, it is not merely 
in lying that one allies oneself with the content of what one says; on the contrary, this is a, 
perhaps the, distinguishing characteristic of assertion (cf. Brandom 1983). The reason why one 
does not, in asserting a conditional, assert its antecedent and its consequent as well, is that one 
doesn’t ally oneself with the antecedent and the consequent, just with the conditional as a 
whole. 
 
14 The idea that liars ally themselves with the false content receives a very helpful discussion in Timmermann and 
Viebahn (2020). The idea is also discussed, though there described using the word ‘warrant’, in Carson (2018: 
158–59). 
15 We are grateful to REDACTED for this point. It is not always the case, however, that in lying one intends that 
the target believe the false content precisely on the basis of one’s committing of oneself to it; sometimes when 
lying one intends only that the target believe that one believe the false content. 
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 An argument for this suggestion, that entrapment is harder morally to justify than mere 
temptation in virtue of the fact that in entrapment the agent is strongly allied with the 
impermissible act, can be found in consideration of the reaction of the target on realizing that 
they have been entrapped. The target may reasonably say ‘but you asked/advised/told me to do 
it!’. It seems to us that this protest carries force. To see the contrast, suppose that the target has 
instead been merely tempted into performing the illegal or immoral act, i.e. in this case there 
has been no procurement of the illegal or immoral act. Here the protest ‘but you intentionally 
tempted me to do it’ does not seem to us to carry the same force, even if the target realized at 
the time that the agent also intended that the target perform the action. (To recur to our earlier 
example, suppose that Francis had protested that Albert had intended him to point his pistol at 
Queen Victoria: such a protest would seem to us to carry little moral weight.) 
 So, the main agent-centred moral problem with entrapment, we suggest, has to do with 
the element of moral alliance that entrapment involves. Entrapment to perform an 
impermissible act is morally objectionable, from an agent-centred point of view, because it 
allies the agent, via the agent’s procurement, or attempted procurement, of it, with an 
impermissible act. The attempted procurement of the act involves the agent, on our account, 
and at least if it is a good attempt, in commending, requesting or enjoining the performance of 
the target’s impermissible act. This, we noted, was structurally similar to a common moral 
stance against lying: when one entraps, one allies oneself with the impermissible action that 
one procures, just as the liar is said to do with respect to the content of the lie. While the two 
stances are logically independent, just as this stance on lying holds that lying is harder for an 
agent morally to justify than is mere deception, we similarly hold that entrapment is harder for 
an agent morally to justify than is mere temptation. 





One might think that it is permissible for an agent to counsel or recommend an 
impermissible action, but only if the agent intends that the target decline the invitation.16 We 
think, however, that if the agent requests or enjoins the impermissible action, intending so to 
do, then that suffices to make the agent’s action harder morally to justify than mere temptation 
would be, whether or not the agent intends the request to be refused. 
Here is a difficult case. Suppose that a principled junior police officer, opposed to 
entrapment, is instructed by a superior to clear up the problem of drug pushers in a certain area 
by going undercover and requesting drugs from suspected pushers. Would it be a morally bad 
course of action for the principled junior officer to obey the letter of the superior’s command 
by saying exactly the things usually said in cases of entrapment (i.e., saying ‘may I buy some 
drugs?’ etc.) with targets thought unlikely to yield to the request? It might be thought that doing 
so would yield the best of all possible worlds: the principled junior officer is happy that no 
entrapment has occurred, and keeps their job, and the senior officer, in blissful ignorance of 
the full picture, is happy that drugs have been requested undercover, albeit unsuccessfully. But 
we demur. We think that even in this case attempting to procure the impermissible action (even 
if not technically entrapment) is harder to justify morally than mere temptation would be, since 
the principled junior officer is still—albeit reluctantly—requesting something that the officer 
thinks should not be requested.  
 Let us illustrate how the objection from moral alliance helps explain some relevant 
moral subtleties. Suppose that there is a right not to be entrapped, but that the right is alienable: 
a person can consent to relinquish the right within a certain context. Take the example of 
entering into a contract of employment as a police officer. Miller, Blackler, and Alexandra 
(2006: 141) note that policing is an endeavour in which corruption is an ever-present and 
 
16 This seems structurally similar to the view that it is permissible intentionally to assert something one believes 
to be false, but only if one does not intend that the hearer believe the assertion. Kant (1997: 28) seems to hold this 
view; for discussion, see Mahon (2009: 207). 
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serious danger, and that ‘testing’ is among the methods used to detect and to deter it. Moreover, 
they suggest, ‘detection and deterrence that might not be acceptable in some other professions’ 
can be justified by the ‘tendency to corruption’ that is, they think, inherent in policing. They 
add (2006: 142) that the testing may involve (what they take to be) targeted or random 
entrapment. Given all these suppositions, would the fact that the target gave a general form of 
consent, in undertaking to be employed as a police officer under such conditions, suffice for 
the target to lose their right not to be entrapped? While we do not want to hold that one can 
‘contract away’ all one’s rights, we do think that in the case of entrapment it is possible and 
permissible for an individual voluntarily to give up their right not to be subject to entrapment 
(cf. Feinberg 2003: 76), and we can easily imagine situations in which it would be permissible 
for a law-enforcement agency to make it a condition of employment that employees ‘contracted 
away’ their right not to be subject to entrapment. By the lights of the objection from moral 
alliance, however, the common view that entrapment should be a method of last resort is 
vindicated even in cases where the target has generally consented to be entrapped. Indeed, the 
objection from moral alliance is the only objection here considered that explains why, even in 
situations in which entrapment might be permissible, entrapment remains harder morally to 
justify, other things being equal, than mere intentional temptation. If it is feasible to monitor 
and promote probity among members of the police force via (mere) intentional temptation, 
virtue testing, or both, then these methods are, other things being equal, morally easier to justify 
than entrapment is. A different reason why, on our account, these methods are morally easier 
to justify is that, in the cases of entrapment that are of present concern, when a target is 
entrapped the target actually does something that the agent considers wrong (under a given 
normative system that the agent takes to be binding on the target). This point, however, cannot 
explain why a failed attempt at entrapment is harder morally to justify than a failed attempt at 
(mere) intentional temptation. The objection from moral alliance can explain this moral 





difference: according to the objection, in cases of entrapment, it is the communicative acts that 
figure in the agent’s procurement, or attempted procurement, of the action that the agent intends 
the target to perform that morally ally the entrapping agent with it. These communicative acts 
ally the agent morally with the planned act even in cases in which the agent’s attempt to entrap 
the target is unsuccessful, either because the agent failed to incline the target’s will towards the 
planned act or for some other reason.  
 
VI. ON THE MORALITY OF VIRTUE TESTING AND MERE 
TEMPTATION 
While we have made several passing remarks about the morality of virtue testing and mere 
temptation, we now go into some more detail. While it is clear from our previous discussion, 
given that these phenomena do not involve procurement, that the objection from moral alliance 
does not apply to them, the question of their ethical acceptability remains.  
Take virtue testing first, and distinguish two general cases: when the agent intends that 
the target pass the test, and when the agent intends that the target fail the test. In the first case, 
we think that virtue testing is generally morally acceptable. It is sometimes acceptable to 
present someone with the opportunity to do wrong even if one does not consider them 
trustworthy. For example, one might hope against hope that they pass the test even if one does 
not think this likely.  
 Still, we do not mean to suggest that it is always acceptable for an agent to test a target 
if the agent intends that the target pass the test. It depends on what the risks and benefits are. If 
the agent knows that the test is relatively unimportant, but that the target’s failure to pass the 
test—or even the stress of the target’s being subjected to the test itself—will cause great harm 
and upset to the target and many others, then it will usually be unacceptable to subject the target 
to the test. We do not believe that just any old motive for testing the target will suffice, even if, 
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as it happens, there is a lot at stake. For example, if the agent tests the target just for a laugh, 
or to see the target squirm under pressure, that would not justify the test, even if it happens to 
be the case that the world would be a lot better as a result. 
 Take now the other general case of virtue testing, in which the agent intends that the 
target fail the test. As could be inferred from our counter-example to the Purist Principle, we 
hold that this is sometimes acceptable. 
 We hold, then, that entrapment, temptation, and virtue testing can be permissible, 
though we have said that entrapment is always harder to justify than are mere temptation and 
mere virtue testing. What features make entrapment, temptation, and virtue testing potentially 
bad actions, in need of justification? We hold that there are two principal bad-making or 
aggravating features: (i) if the agent believes that the target is not disposed to perform the 
impermissible action (or something as bad or worse) in the future, and (ii) if the agent does not 
intend that, as a result of the target’s performing the impermissible action now, the 
impermissible action (or an equally bad or worse action) will not be performed later. These 
features would, if not outweighed, suffice to make entrapment or temptation or virtue testing 
(as the case might be) impermissible.  
 Both condition (i) and condition (ii), and their conjunction, can be outweighed, 
however. For example, suppose that the Chief of Police of Town X believes that all his officers 
are honest, but, in order to prevent vast civil unrest, needs to be able to demonstrate this fact. 
To this end he leaves money lying around the police headquarters in Town X in order to weed 
out any subordinate officers that there may be that are likely to steal money. Here the Chief 
does not think that the officers are likely to steal in the future unless caught now, since he thinks 
that they are honest, so condition (i) holds. His motive in leaving the money lying around is 
not in order to prevent stealing, but rather to demonstrate that Town X’s police force is honest.  
Indeed, the Chief might even think that any bad apples there might be would simply sign up to 





become officers of the police of Town Y, and steal even more under that lax regime. It follows 
that condition (ii) also holds. Nevertheless, it seems clear to us that his goal of demonstrating 
the honesty of the police force of Town X and thereby avoiding widespread civil unrest would 
justify the Police Chief’s action, even if the Chief had to engage in (mere) temptation to do it. 
Would it also justify the Chief in entrapping for this goal? As we said earlier, entrapment is 
harder to justify ethically than is mere virtue testing or mere temptation, but if the stakes were 
high enough (i.e. the possible consequences of the unrest in our example serious enough) we 
should not want to deny that the badness of entrapment could be outweighed.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We have distinguished three related phenomena: virtue testing, temptation, and entrapment. 
Making use of previous work, we provided a definition of entrapment, which introduced the 
key notion of procurement. Virtue testing is, in a sense, the weakest of the three notions: it need 
not involve either procurement or tempting. Temptation and entrapment differ principally in 
that the former need not involve  procurement. While we hold that all temptation is virtue 
testing, we deny that all virtue testing is temptation; we deny that all temptation is entrapment, 
and we deny that all entrapment involves temptation.  
We have considered two attempts to show that entrapment is wrong: the objection from 
temptation and the objection from intention. We have rejected each of them, and we have spent 
more time discussing the latter, more plausible objection. It is based on an initially attractive 
position, the Purist Principle, that it is impermissible to intend that someone perform an 
impermissible act. We have argued that this principle should be rejected. Instead, we have 
argued for what we called the ‘objection from moral alliance’. According to it, entrapment is 
morally worse than mere intentional temptation because, when one entraps, one strongly allies 
oneself with the wrongful action that one procures.  
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Lastly, we have argued that, while virtue testing and (mere) temptation are not subject to 
the argument from moral alliance, they, like entrapment, are not always acceptable. We have, 
making use of our work discussing the Purist Principle, identified two important bad-making 
conditions that, if present, need to be outweighed for the entrapment or temptation or virtue-
testing to be permissible. We also gestured towards further considerations concerning risks, 
benefits, harms and motives that could potentially outweigh these bad-making conditions. In 
short, our final position is that, while it is in many circumstances morally permissible to test a 
target, and in some circumstances permissible intentionally to tempt a target, the action of 
entrapping a target into doing something impermissible is, while not always impermissible, 
harder to justify morally than either of these.  
What we have mainly sought to do here is to recover what we take to be ultimately 
salvageable from the objection from temptation, and it has turned out that this, in the form of 
the objection from moral alliance, is an agent-centred objection to entrapment rather than a 
target-centred one. Nevertheless, we intend our discussion to have been without prejudice to 
the question whether acts of entrapment are typically wrongs to, or breaches of the rights of, 
the target. We have not precluded that they are such wrongs, either for a reason independent of 
the objection from temptation or because acts of entrapment typically involve morally 
unacceptable cases of intentional temptation that wrong the target. Nevertheless, the power of 
the objection from moral alliance, and some of its interest, lies in the fact that it serves to 
explain, on the one hand, why acts of entrapment are harder to justify morally, even in such 
cases, than acts of mere temptation and of virtue testing and, on the other hand, why failed 
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